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The fundamental value premise of business process outsourcing (BPO) is greater process efficiency at reduced
costs of ownership.  However, recent studies suggest that BPO may add cost and friction, and require more
management attention than originally envisioned to realize the benefits of outsourcing.  Service dissatisfaction
ensues, giving rise to a BPO paradox.  This study focuses on the role of governance choice in resolving this
emerging paradox.  We build on the information processing view of the firm and theories of interfirm
coordination to argue that the alignment between information requirements (IR) of the BPO relationship and
information capabilities (IC) of the governance solution is central to service satisfaction.  We use this
conceptual model of fit to identify two aligned configurations of BPO governance, which reflect the end points
of a continuum in decreasing order of IR and IC.  These configurations are used to test hypotheses predicting
alternative governance choices and the impact of these choices on service satisfaction.  Our empirical analysis
of survey data on 137 BPO relationships suggests that aligned BPO configurations are marked by higher levels
of satisfaction than nonaligned relationships, and that underinvestment in IC has a marked negative impact
on satisfaction relative to overinvestment.  The findings enhance managerial understanding of governance
choice in BPO, and underscore the normative implications of the alignment between IR of the BPO relationship
and IC of the governance solution on service satisfaction and the BPO paradox.
Keywords:  Business process outsourcing, governance, information requirements, information capabilities,
outsourcing paradox
Introduction
Business process outsourcing (BPO) is fast gaining ground as an imperative for competitive success in modern organizations.
However, recent studies1 suggest that instead of simplifying operations, BPO often introduces complexity, cost, and the
requirement for broader and deeper management skills than originally envisioned, calling into question the potential of BPO as
a strategic driver for cost savings and organizational flexibility.  Many firms have responded to this emerging paradox by
transferring part of their outsourced operations back in-house.  However, the economic ramifications of such failed BPO
relationships are pronounced, and include a potential adverse impact on customer value and overall firm competitiveness.  
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This study investigates the role of BPO governance in resolving the paradox.  Prior research on governance choice in outsourcing
relationships has been primarily influenced by transaction cost economics (TCE), which defines a governance solution as the
contractual structure that participant firms use to formalize an outsourcing relationship.  The TCE perspective focuses on appro-
priation concerns that arise from relational uncertainty (Pisano 1990; Balakrishnan and Koza 1993), and suggests that hierarchical
controls are an effective response to such hazards of cooperation.  The greater the appropriation concern, the more hierarchical
is the contractual structure (e.g., joint venture) that governs the relationship.
In order to facilitate our understanding of BPO governance, the above premises of TCE must be enriched to recognize two aspects
of BPO.  First, the coordination of critical tasks among participant firms involves uncertainty in execution and management of
the outsourced process that is different from appropriation concerns of relational uncertainty.  Such process uncertainty relates
to whether the outsourced process is well understood, how process tasks will be allocated between participant firms and executed,
and the extent to which mutual adjustment in behavior is required during process execution.  As BPO becomes more global and
the user firm and the provider are increasingly characterized by different nationalities, the role of such process uncertainty in
structuring the relationship turns more pronounced.  
A second related concern is that as BPO emerges as a strategic, collaborative paradigm (Alborz et al. 2003) that increasingly spans
regional boundaries, more insights are required into how contractual institutions that align incentives among participant firms are
actually employed to coordinate activities in the BPO relationship.  This viewpoint is supported by theories on interfirm
coordination, which suggest that contractual coordination (or the mutual exchange of rights) and procedural coordination (or the
mutual exchange of information) perform complementary roles in governance, and that their systemic fit impacts relationship
performance (Sobrero and Schrader 1998).  Therefore, a model of BPO governance must not limit attention to any one of these
dimensions to the exclusion of the other.  
This study builds on the information processing view (IPV) of the firm (Galbraith 1973) and theories of interfirm coordination
to address the above issues.  We conceive of the BPO relationship as a fit between information requirements (IR) of the BPO
relationship and information capabilities (IC) of the governance solution.  The IPV, which posits a strong relationship between
task (process) uncertainty and IR, is extended to recognize relational uncertainty as an additional antecedent to IR.  In addition
to process and relational uncertainty, the model incorporates the influence of the strategic impact of BPO on IR.  Theories of
interfirm coordination are used to conceptualize IC of the governance solution as a multi-dimensional construct comprising the
contractual, procedural, and technological capabilities used to coordinate activities in the BPO relationship.  We posit that the
alignment between IR and IC is central to service satisfaction and resolving the BPO paradox.
The empirical testing of the model uses survey data on a range of 137 BPO relationships.  Cluster analysis is used to identify two
aligned configurations, (high IR, high IC) comprising strategic BPO relationships and (low IR, low IC) representing transactional
BPO relationships.  These configurations reflect the end points of a continuum of governance models in decreasing order of IR
and IC.  The configurations are subsequently used to validate that firms, which choose a governance form that is aligned with their
IR, are marked by relatively higher levels of service satisfaction.  The confirmatory analysis accounts for endogeneity in
governance choice by employing a series of two-stage, self-selection models that simultaneously capture decisions of governance
choice as well as the observed and unobserved antecedents of these decisions and their impact on service satisfaction.  Finally,
the analysis suggests that underinvestment in IC has a marked negative impact on satisfaction relative to overinvestment.
The study provides a parsimonious model for governance choice, and emphasizes an early understanding of process requirements
and the contingent design of governance capabilities in BPO initiatives.  The results hold normative implications for managers
on how performance would vary if the aligned governance structure is not chosen.  The analysis also offers empirical support to
the information processing theory, and responds to the call to identify patterns of IR and test their fit with organization structure
and design (Daft and Lengel 1986).
The balance of the article is organized as follows:  Related literature on the information processing view of the firm and interfirm
coordination is investigated in the next section.  The conceptual model is then specified.  Research design, data collection, and
analysis are discussed.  The paper concludes with a presentation of key findings.
Literature Review
This study draws from and contributes to three broad streams of literature.  We draw on the IPV to develop our conceptual model
of fit and identify antecedents of IR of the outsourced process.  We then analyze the literature on management of interfirm
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relations to identify complementary, mutually reinforcing dimensions of the BPO governance structure.  Finally, we draw on the
strategy literature to underscore the implications of alternative governance choices and misalignment on service satisfaction.  
IP Theory and Selective Alignment
The IPV was developed by Galbraith (1973), who identified organizational IR and antecedent uncertainty as conditioning
variables of organization design.  The principles of the IPV have since been extended to analyze the structure and coordination
of interfirm activities.  For example, Bensaou and Venkatraman (1995) focused on the fit between IR of a manufacturer and IC
of a supplier to identify dominant configurations of interfirm relationships in the automotive industry.  We draw on their work
to conceptualize a BPO relationship as a fit between the BPO relationship’s IR and the governance solution’s IC.  However, we
focus on specific dimensions of uncertainty that are antecedents to the user firm’s IR, and identify process and relational attributes
that are indicative of such uncertainty.  This formative approach helps the user firm better manage its dynamic IR.  Moreover,
our analysis systematically tests for the predominance of one interorganizational pattern over the other.  It compares alternative
governance modes in BPO and, analogous to the discriminating alignment hypothesis in transaction cost economics (TCE),
confirms the positive impact of alignment between IR of the BPO relationship and IC of the governance solution on service
satisfaction.
Dimensions of BPO Governance
Our study is also related to the literature on the design and management of interfirm relations.  The two fundamental and
complementary dimensions that characterize the structuring of interfirm relations are contractual coordination, which describes
the distribution of rights in the relationship, and procedural coordination, which specifies the coordination of information flows
in the relationship (Dibbern et al. 2004; Sobrero and Schrader 1998).  Sobrero and Schrader state that “while contractual
coordination refers to institutions that may be in place to govern the relationship…procedural coordination asks how these
institutions are used, and describes the day-to-day interactions between the firms” (1998, p. 590).  The separate investigation of
these dimensions precludes useful insights on governance.  We adopt a holistic approach that subsumes both dimensions.  We
consider not only contractual enforceability of the transaction emphasized by rational agent perspectives such as TCE, but also
its procedural feasibility and transferability emphasized by process-oriented perspectives.
Governance and Service Satisfaction in BPO
Relatively few empirical studies have addressed the performance implications of alternative modes of organization (Masten 1993;
Rumelt 1982).  Further, the contrast between empirical support for process-oriented theories of organization and rational agent
perspectives is stark.  For example, as of the year 2000, there were over 600 documented empirical articles on TCE with
exponential growth therein (Boerner and Macher 2002).  Similar work is required to establish congruity between evidence and
alternative theories of organization (Alborz et al. 2003), and to provide a broader understanding of new paradigms in outsourcing.
For example, TCE does not adequately explain the rapid growth of strategic BPO relationships and partnership forms that are
characterized by relatively high contractual hazards.  This study responds to the call (Williamson 2000) to confront such issues
and develop new conceptual apparatus that helps us gain a deeper understanding of complex governance issues.  Further, prior
research suggests that normative implications drawn from empirical analyses involving a self-selection bias may be confounding
(Heckman 1979; Maddala 1983; Masten 1993).  Our study addresses this issue and examines whether unobserved attributes
underlying governance choice contribute to the BPO paradox.  
Conceptual Model of Selective Alignment
between IR and IC:  A Summary
Our predictive model of organization in BPO relationships is outlined in Figure 1.
The conceptualization of the constructs, including identification of antecedents of IR and sub-constructs of IC, is described below.
Global Information Technology Management
112 2005 — Twenty-Sixth International Conference on Information Systems
Information 




FIT InformationCapabilities (IC) of the
Governance  Solution
Figure 1.  Conceptual Model of Fit between IR and IC
IR of the BPO Relationship
Information refers to relevant, accurate, and timely data that effects a change in knowledge (Tushman and Nadler 1978).  One
class of definitions (Eppler and Mengis 2004; Schick et al. 1990) characterizes IR in terms of the information amount that has
to be processed and integrated within a certain time period.  Another group of studies (Iselin 1993; Keller & Staelin 1987) refers
to qualitative attributes of organizational information to define IR.  We integrate these schools of thought to define IR of the user
firm as qualitative and quantitative changes in its information domain during design and management of the relationship.  
We use three attributes of organizational information as indicative sub-constructs of IR:  information amount, information
dynamism, and technological sophistication of organizational systems.  The literature (Daft and Lengel 1986; Galbraith 1973)
supports the use of these sub-constructs as indicators of IR.  We define information dynamism in terms of variability in content
and meaning of information within a specified time interval.  The dynamic nature of information allows for feedback and
adaptation to different information environments of BPO decision makers.  Greater technological sophistication is required to
collect information at the points of origin and direct it, at appropriate times, to the appropriate places in the organizational
hierarchy, preventing information overload of the decision maker (Galbraith 1973).  We posit that given a set of outsourcing
objectives, an increase in the user firm’s IR is reflected in an increase in the amount of information, generated in the firm, the
dynamism of organizational information and technological sophistication of its organizational systems.
Antecedents of IR
TCE focuses on the manifest presence of relational uncertainty, which, when combined with certain contracting situations,
aggravates appropriation concerns and engenders costly contracts.  The role of task or process uncertainty in governance choice
has been less developed and may be equally important.  We extend the IPV to include both process and relational uncertainty as
antecedents to IR in the context of BPO.  We provide below summary comments on the conceptualization of these antecedents,
including the nature of their impact on the user firm’s IR.
Process Uncertainty:  We conceptualize process uncertainty in terms of complexity and modularity of the outsourced process.
Complexity encompasses the notions of analyzability and variety.  An analyzable process comprises events that are hard,
measurable, and determinant (Daft and Weick 1984).  When a process is analyzable, outcomes are well-understood, and the
process administrators follow an objective, computational procedure to resolve problems.  Our notion of process variety is
consistent with the early conceptualization of content variety, variability in the inputs or outputs of a process (Perrow 1967;
Thompson 1967), as well as the more recent concept of sequential variety, diversity of work processes that an organization uses
to transform inputs into outputs (Pentland 2003).  Modularity refers to the ability of the process to function as a coherent subtask
that can be analyzed, modified, and enhanced, independent of its influence on other organizational processes.
An increase in process uncertainty, as assessed by the above sub-constructs, results in an increase in the user firm’s IR.  Uncer-
tainty in the outsourced process circumscribes the ability of the firm to comprehensively anticipate needs and contingencies in
the exchange process, and specify these ex ante.  Measurement of performance and output of the process is also difficult, and task
allocation is transacted and renegotiated frequently.  Also, contingent situations that arise on account of uncertainty must be solved
using judgment and experience rather than rules or computational routines and necessitate a wider scope of information sharing
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Figure 2.  Organizational IR and its Antecedents
(Perrow 1967).  Finally, the extended range of stakeholders involved in supporting and managing the relationship, including
transferring value back to the user firm, also increases the firm’s IR.
Relational Uncertainty:  We conceptualize relational uncertainty in terms of contractual incompleteness of the relationship or
the lack of ex ante contractual instructions regarding obligations of contracting parties.  Institutional economics validates incom-
pleteness as an economizing action in the context of uncertainty in that including more detail in a contract involves direct transac-
tion costs.  Relational uncertainty increases IR of the user firm through (1) limiting the ability of the firm to prescribe and enforce
specific actions and (2) enhancing the need to create commitment levels from which desirable actions evolve (Williamson 1983).
Strategic Impact of BPO
Our model controls for the strategic impact of BPO.  Strategic BPO relationships are characterized by high payoffs and the
relationship between the user firm and the service provider is frequently long-term, close, and involves a sustained, m and
complex pattern of interaction between and within each of these firms (Ford 1990).  This, in turn, implies frequent communication
and greater incentives and opportunities to share information (Krackhardt 1992).  This nature of the information exchange process
embodied in a strategic BPO relationship results in an increase in the user firm’s IR.  The conceptualization of IR and its
antecedents is outlined in Figure 2.
IC of the Governance Solution
BPO governance is conceptualized as a second-order construct that includes the institutions, processes, and technology that
empower decision making and action in the BPO relationship to deliver sustainable value.  We use theories on structuring and
management of interfirm relations to identify three complementary dimensions of BPO governance:  contractual coordination
(CC), procedural coordination (PC), and technological coordination (TC).  These dimensions are described below.
Contractual Coordination:  CC refers to the mutual exchange of rights in the BPO relationship, and represents a mutual attempt
to control uncertainty in desired behavior and outputs.  This study includes three dimensions of CC:  contract type, contract length,
and contractual emphasis on control versus coordination.
Procedural Coordination:  Strategists (Doz et al. 1989; Sobrero and Schrader 1998) have argued that interfirm coordination is
achieved not through contractual mechanisms, but by day-to-day communication between parties involved in the relationship.
Sobrero and Schrader (1998) state that these day-to-day interactions, reflected in the extent to which parties coordinate processes
to exchange information, describe PC in the relationship.  They are structurally identified by the contract but actually reflect how
the contract is implemented.  The four dimensions of PC used in this study are sharing of risk, division of bargaining power
(Gardner and Cooper 1988), extent of joint action (Robicheaux and El-Ansary 1976; Bensaou and Venkatraman 1995), and nature
of performance metrics.
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Figure 3.  Second-Order Construct of IC of the Governance Solution
Technological Coordination:  TC refers to the role of technological mechanisms used to facilitate contractual and procedural
coordination in the BPO relationship.  The three dimensions of TC include scope of IT use, intensity of IT use, and sophistication
of coordination systems (Bensaou and Venkatraman 1995).  The second-order construct of governance is depicted in Figure 3.
Fit between IR and IC
Our model of selective alignment between IR and IC points out that BPO relationships, which differ in their IR, when governed
by allied contractual, procedural, and technological governance capabilities, have a positive impact on service satisfaction.
Service Satisfaction
Sureshchandar et al. (2002) argue that customer satisfaction should be developed along the same factors as service quality.  We
adapt their conceptualization of customer satisfaction to identify four sub-constructs:  reliability, responsiveness, responsibility,
and systematization.  Reliability refers to the ability to perform the promised service dependably and accurately.  Responsiveness
reflects willingness to help customers and provide prompt service.  Responsibility reflects accountability of the provider.  Finally,
systematization refers to the processes, procedures, systems, and technology that make a service a seamless one.
Empirical Analysis
Instrument Design and Refinement
A structured questionnaire was developed based on comprehensive reviews of academic and practitioner oriented literature and
initial interviews with 20 BPO experts2.  These exploratory interviews were conducted with the underlying objective of assessing
Mani et al./Governance and the BPO Paradox
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applicability of the information processing model to interfirm BPO relationships, assessing the validity of distinguishing
characteristics of our conceptual model, validating logical linkages between the constructs, and obtaining more clarity of
perspective on desirable sample characteristics.  Consequent to these exploratory interviews, we developed a structured ques-
tionnaire that was pretested with a total of 30 medium to large organizations, market research firms, and academicians.  The
instrument was tested for clarity of content, scope, and purpose (or content validity).  A seven-point Likert scale was used for most
questions; however, some questions involved binary choices.  The pretest was instrumental in enhancing our understanding of
respondents’ perceptions of questions, clarifying instructions and other pertinent communication, and improving definition and
measurement of constructs. 
Data Collection
Our sample, which comprised small, medium, and large U.S.  organizations, was representative of a range of outsourcing
objectives.  We received a total of 145 responses (response rate of 10 percent).  After accounting for missing data, the dataset
comprised 137 valid responses.  Respondents to the questionnaire belonged to executive management of participating firms, with
functional responsibility of a bulk of the respondents belonging to the “Chairman/CEO/President” and “Director-Level
Management” categories.  The respondents were offered the option to complete any of a print survey, telephone survey, or an
online questionnaire; however, almost all responses were received through the online questionnaire.  All respondents were assured
that their responses would remain confidential and that results would be reported only in aggregate, thereby addressing privacy
concerns and minimizing potential bias in self-reported data.
Instrument Reliability
We averaged the internally consistent estimates of each indicator (Hoyle and Smith 1994; Kishton and Widaman 1994) to obtain
manifest variables (parcels) that measured a unidimensional construct.  The reliability estimates for the indicators, as measured
by Cronbach’s alpha, ranged from 0.73 to 0.93, indicating high levels of internal consistency.
Empirical Analysis
Our empirical approach comprised the three steps summarized in Table 1.
Step 1:  Structural Modeling.  We first validated a second-order construct of IC.  After verifying reliability and validity of the
model, we obtained factor scores for constructs IR, IC, and IC sub-constructs, which were used in subsequent stages of the
analysis.  All constructs were tested for convergent and discriminant validity.  We tested convergent validity by checking the
critical ratios of each factor (Thong et al. 1996).  Discriminant validity was examined by comparing construct variance extracted
with squared correlations among constructs (Segars and Grover 1998; Thong et al. 1996).  





The objectives of this analysis were to validate a second-order construct of IC, and obtain factor scores for
constructs IR and IC (used in the regressions in Step 3) and its sub-constructs, CC, PC, and TC (used in




Cluster analysis (CA) on the process variables was used to derive clusters of IR.  Within each identified
cluster of IR, we performed CA on the factor scores for CC, PC and TC obtained in Step 1.  Therefore, each
of the final clusters represents a fit between IR and IC.  Two aligned output configurations were identified
at this step:  “complex-own-transform” (high IR, high IC) and “modular-transfer-improve” (low IR, low




Heckman’s two-stage regression was used to correct for endogeneity in governance choice.  In the first
stage, we estimated a probit model specifying the governance choice equation and calculated the inverse
Mills ratio, a correction term for self-selection.  Second-stage models, incorporating this estimate, evaluated
the impact of governance choice and misalignment on satisfaction and provided consistent, unbiased
estimates.
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IR Information Amount 0.795 0.84 0.63
Information Dynamism 0.793 
Technological Sophistication 0.796 








IC CC(CC) 0.639 0.75 0.50
PC(PC) 0.600
TC(TC) 0.863










IC Gov_Str Contract Type 0.878 0.82 0.6
Contract Length 0.798
Degree of Formalization -0.625
Coord_Proc Joint Action 0.790 0.85 0.59
Risk Sharing 0.826
Sharing of Bargaining Power 0.724
Metrics 0.713
Tech_Cap Intensity of IT Use 0.722 0.79 0.56
Scope of IT Use 0.784
Coordination Infrastructure 0.728
Tables 2, 3, and 4 provide reliability estimates for the IR and IC constructs.  Table 2 summarizes factor loadings and reliability
of the IR construct.  All factor loadings are significant (p < 0.001), and the composite reliability for the construct is 0.63.  IC is
conceptualized as a second-order construct comprising three complementary dimensions:  CC, PC, and TC.  Correlations among
these dimensions are significant but below the limit of 0.90 (Bagozzi et al. 1991).  Hence, a second-order factor model comprising
an integrative latent representation of IC is useful in explaining such correlations (Segars and Grover 1998).  Table 3 details the
factor loadings for the second-order IC construct while Table 4 details the factor loadings for the first-order dimensions of IC.
All factor loadings were significant and of high magnitude.
Step 2:  Cluster Analysis.  The overall objective of the second step of the empirical analysis was to identify clusters of fit
between IR and IC.  This provides insights into patterns or forms of BPO governance and helps to affirm whether (1) the IR of
the outsourced process and IC of the governance solution distinguish these governance forms and (2) the differentiation between
aligned and nonaligned configurations is useful in predicting differences in service satisfaction.  For the CA, we use the ante-
cedents of IR (i.e., the process variables) and the sub-constructs of IC (i.e., CC, PC, and TC) instead of aggregate measures of
IR and IC, since these variables provide more insight into the nature of governance forms in BPO.
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The primary issues in CA involve determining the number of clusters and assigning membership to the observations.  We used
Punj and Stewart’s (1983) recommendations for CA, that is, (1) use of standardized variables, (2) use of the squared Euclidian
distance as a similarity measure, and (3) use of Ward’s minimum variance method for cluster formation.  Milligan and Cooper
(1985) compared 30 methods for estimating the number of population clusters.  The three criteria that performed best in these
simulation studies were the pseudo F statistic (PSF), the pseudo t2 (PST) transformation, and the cubic clustering criterion (CCC).
We used these three heuristic methods to determine the number of clusters.  All three indices support a two-cluster solution across
the antecedents of IR, C1, and C2.  The next step was to run the same cluster algorithm for each of these two clusters across the
three IC variables:  CC, PC, and TC.  The indices support a two-cluster solution for cluster C1 (C11 and C12), and a two-cluster
solution for cluster C2 (C21 and C22).
In summary, the data analytic procedure uncovers four configurations of fit/misfit between IR and IC.  We describe two of these
clusters as aligned ( C11 and C22) and two as nonaligned (C12 and C21).  The first aligned cluster, C11, is marked by low process
complexity and strategic importance, high process modularity, and low contractual incompleteness.  The allied IC include low
levels of contractual, procedural, and technological coordination and support autonomous ownership and functioning of the
outsourced process.  We call this cluster “Modular–Transfer–Improve,” reflecting the independence of the outsourced process,
its relative ease of transferability, and BPO objectives of process efficiency and improvement.  The second aligned cluster, C22,
is marked by high process complexity and strategic importance, low process modularity, and high levels of contractual
incompleteness.  The allied IC support collaborative ownership and functioning of the outsourced process.  We label this cluster
“Complex–Own–Transform,” reflecting the complex interdependencies of the outsourced process, difficulty in transferability and
resultant joint ownership, and BPO objectives of business transformation.
We use Scheffe’s F-test to examine differences in values of the dependent measures of performance across the clusters.  The
multiple comparison tests establish that the distinction between aligned and nonaligned configurations is useful in predicting
differences in levels of service satisfaction.  Table 5 illustrates that satisfaction levels in the nonaligned clusters are lower than
the aligned clusters, a difference that is more pronounced when IR are high.
Step 3:  Switching Regression.  Empirical analyses that suggest a direct relationship between governance choice and satisfaction
assume that firms’ governance choices are not influenced by firm- or transaction-level characteristics.  However, this proposition
is untenable (Leiblein et al. 2002).  Research studies and anecdotal evidence point to the impact of relative firm-level capabilities
on governance decisions.  This implies that firms self-select governance forms based on their own maximizing analyses rather
than on a random basis (Leiblein et al. 2002).  Further, it is likely that these unobserved firm- and transaction-level characteristics
impact performance and, in turn, service satisfaction.  A failure to correct for this selection bias while estimating the impact of
governance choice on satisfaction threatens external and internal validity (Berk 1983), and results in biased and inconsistent
normative implications (Heckman 1979; Maddala 1983; Masten 1993).  Differences in satisfaction may be attributed to
governance choice when, in actual fact, they are due to unobserved factors underlying governance choice.
In the present study, the estimates in the satisfaction model need to be corrected by controlling for the user firm’s propensity to
choose a particular governance form.  Using Heckman’s two-stage regression approach, a first-stage probit model is estimated
to specify a selection equation (Equation 1) and calculate the inverse Mills ratio, which is used as a control variable in the second-
stage satisfaction model.  Second-stage models that incorporate this correction provide consistent and unbiased estimates.
Controls we use in both stages of the regression include firm size, firm tenure, prior association, and environmental dynamism.
First Stage Probit Model
IC is defined to be equal to one for cases where a firm chooses the strategic BPO governance form—Complex–Own–Transform—
marked by high IR and IC, and equal to zero for transactions where a firm chooses the transactional BPO governance form—
Modular–Transfer–Improve—marked by low IR and IC.  We defined the threshold value for high IC as the mean response value
of 4.  Therefore, the choice of IC for a given transaction is estimated using the following probit model:
Prob(Yi = 1) = Prob(Yi > 4) = M($'Xi) (1)
IC Misfit is then defined as 1– M($'Xi), when IC is equal to one and as M($'Xi) when IC is equal to zero.  This variable measures
the probability that relatively higher IC are employed in transactional BPO relationships with low IC, and the probability that
relatively lower IC are employed for strategic BPO relationships that have chosen high IC.
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* p < 0.05;  ** p < 0.01;  *** p < 0.0001
Model I presents a baseline case comprising controls while Model II introduces IR as an explanatory variable.  The analysis
confirms the significant impact of IR on choice of IC.  Given the results of the log likelihood ratio tests and the pseudo-R²,
estimates from Model II are used to formulate the inverse Mills ratio for the second-stage satisfaction model.  Table 6 describes
estimates from the two first stage governance choice models.
Table 6.  Probit Estimates for First-Stage IC Choice Modela,b
Independent Variables Model I Model II
Intercept -2.1858*** -5.9486***
Firm Size  0.8642**  0.4028*
Firm Tenure  0.0309 -0.0086
Prior Association  0.5030*  0.2291
Environmental Uncertainty  0.3050***  0.2305*
IR  1.0931***
N 137 137
Log Likelihood -68.980 -49.376
Pseudo-R Square  0.19  0.42
aPositive coefficients indicate a greater probability of Complex–Own–Transform
b*p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001
Mani et al./Governance and the BPO Paradox
2005 — Twenty-Sixth International Conference on Information Systems 119
Table 7.  Estimates for Second-Stage Satisfaction Models
Independent
Variables Model 1 Model II









Intercept  4.4190***  4.5578*** 6.1796*** 4.4593*** 6.5556*** 5.3601***
Firm Size  0.3174*  0.1230 0.0665 –0.1358 0.0195 –0.0716
Firm Tenure  0.0367  0.0253 –0.0291 0.1793** –0.0288 0.1713**
Prior Association  0.6725***  0.5346** 0.4811* 0.3306 0.5598** 0.1033
Environmental
Uncertainty
–0.2389*** –0.3116*** –0.3356*** –0.2837** –0.3491*** –0.2731**
Governance Choice  0.2835  1.0153***
IC Misfit –2.2379*** –5.653
Correction for self-
selection (W8)
–0.6897** –1.1767*** –0.4408† Excluded - not
significant
–2.3650†
Model F  12.28***  12.87*** 13.21*** 6.11*** 12.99*** 5.75***
Adjusted R2   0.29   0.34 0.40 0.38 0.39 0.40
†p < 0.10; *p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001
Second Stage Satisfaction Estimates
Table 7 provides the results of our satisfaction models.  Model I provides a baseline specification that does not correct for self-
selection.  Model II adds the correction for self-selection, which is negative and strongly significant, indicating that the firms have
self-selected the most favorable form of governance:  unobserved characteristics underlying IC choice strongly influence service
satisfaction of that transaction relative to an equivalent transaction of alternative IC choice.  While Model I indicates that IC
choice does not impact satisfaction, Model II suggests that strategic, collaborative BPO relationships characterized by high IC
exhibit relatively superior satisfaction characteristics.  Self-selection reduces the impact of IC choice on performance in Model I.
Model III separately estimates models for the two governance forms while correcting for self-selection.  The inverse Mills ratio
is negative and significant for both governance forms.  We note that while prior association and environmental uncertainty impact
service satisfaction in collaborative BPO relationships, firm tenure and environmental uncertainty impact service satisfaction in
autonomous BPO relationships.  
Model IV tests the selective alignment proposition by examining the impact of the IC Misfit variable on service satisfaction.  We
find that the inverse mills ratio turns insignificant in the case of strategic outsourcing, indicating the lack of a selection bias.  This
is likely given the correlation between the ability to self-select and misfit.  Therefore, we run the regression after excluding the
self-selection correction.  We find that governance misfit does have a negative impact on performance for strategic, collaborative
BPO relationships; however, the variable is not significant in the autonomous governance form, implying underinvestment in IC
has a greater impact on service satisfaction than overinvestment.
Discussion and Conclusion
This study considers two perspectives on governance of outsourcing relationships, each of which specifies the role of different
facets of uncertainty experienced by participant firms as important to their decision of governance choice.  The economic approach
highlights the role of appropriation concerns and manifest relational uncertainty, while the organizational approach points to the
complexity of task coordination and execution or task uncertainty.  Our study suggests that IR of the BPO relationship is a
function of both these dimensions of uncertainty, and is an important basis for the choice of governance solution in BPO.  This
is consistent with our finding that a governance solution is more than a contractual mechanism to control opportunism; it includes
processes and technology that enable participant firms to coordinate tasks and responsibilities so as to create value, mutually adjust
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while 18 percent of the respondents indicated that product/ process innovation was an important dimension of their outsourcing strategy.  This
is in alignment with a recent study by Accenture which stated that over 65 percent of organizations in their analysis were outsourcing processes
of medium to high strategic value.  Top reasons to outsource in their sample were converting capital to expense, access to technology, and
centralization and standardization.
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behavior, and allay fears and concerns about the relationship.  We find that service satisfaction in BPO is contingent upon the
alignment between IR of the outsourced process and IC of the governance solution.  
The results hold normative implications for outsourcing managers, and point to interesting directions in future research.  For
example, a comparison between local versus cross-regional BPO partnerships as well as analyses of local relationship
characteristics by region may provide useful insights into how the institutional context of a particular country influences mutual
trust and governance structures.  Further, as BPO becomes increasingly global in its reach and strategic in its impact, greater
difficulty in enforcing property rights, greater coordination challenges and costs, and specific legal and cultural contexts may all
encourage choice of a particular governance form.  
The analysis suggests that the unobserved factors that increase the likelihood of IC choice also decrease the likelihood of
satisfaction with the chosen IC.  For example, the decision to pursue BPO may reflect the mimetic adoption of a popular industry
practice, which is also likely to adversely impact satisfaction.  The BPO paradox detailed in industry surveys and anecdotal
evidence may be partly explained by such self-selection.  As the industry matures and aligns organization with outsourced process
requirements, we are likely to find increased evidence against the paradox.  
The controls for service satisfaction in both aligned governance forms are consistent with our theoretical expectations.  For
example, prior cooperative association between participant firms positively impacts satisfaction in strategic, collaborative BPO.
This confirms the important role that mutual trust and commitment play in strategic BPO.  Similarly, firm tenure influences
satisfaction in transactional BPO relationships.  This is likely because older firms are more likely to house mature processes that
lend themselves to transferability and autonomous functioning.
We find that strategic, collaborative BPO relationships exhibit characteristics associated with higher levels of satisfaction.
Further, we also find that underinvestment in IC in these relationships adversely impacts service satisfaction more than
overinvestment in IC in autonomous relationships.  Both findings are consistent with the intrinsic linkages that a strategic business
process shares with its organizational context and its direct impact on customer value.  Therefore, while success in strategic BPO
relationships can create competitive differentiation and advantage for the user firm, relatively higher recovery and transition costs
of failed relationships can create a significant dent in its bottom line and satisfaction.  The findings, while questioning the
consistent theme in the strategy literature that partnership models are inherently problematic, are aligned with market trends that
indicate a growth in strategic BPO.3
Finally, the study helps to answer an important question on the rapidly maturing phenomenon of strategic BPO:  How do the
factors affecting the likelihood of outsourcing a strategically important process influence its subsequent performance? We find
that large firms that face uncertainty in their business environment are likely to engage in strategic outsourcing.  However, while
user firms are likely to use BPO as an organizational lever that provides access to skills required to cope with dynamic business
environments, such uncertainty adversely impacts service satisfaction.  A strategic lesson that may be inferred from this finding
is that user firms probably outsource the responsibility of management of uncertainty in their business environment to the service
provider.  Given their intimate knowledge of consumer and product markets, the user firms must work collaboratively with the
provider to manage such uncertainty.    
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